These appendices contain materials, results, and robustness checks that supplement the main text. Additional materials related to the implementation of the experiments can be found on the author's personal website, including: The original memo detailing the sampling and randomization strategy; a summary of the focus group discussions that informed design; the complete field manual for project implementation; and the survey instrument. 
A Summary of the main hypotheses
The main hypotheses are summarized in Figure A .1 following the experimental design and using hypothetical data. The 2x2 table shows windfall and tax contexts in both low and high information environments, creating four experimental groups mirrored in the figure. The first three predictions-that taxes cause more monitoring, participation, and sanctioning than windfalls-are captured by a shift upwards of the tax line vis-a-vis the windfall line (as well as the plus signs in the first two rows of the far right column in the table). Hypothesis four, predicting that the impact of (negative) information on political action will be greater in a tax than in a windfall environment, is denoted by the slope of the tax line rising more steeply than the slope of the windfall line (as well as the positive treatment interaction in the bottom right cell of the Taxes are predicted to lead to more monitoring, participation, and sanctioning than windfalls, illustrated by the fact that the tax line is higher than the windfall line (and the plus signs in the first two rows of the far right column in the table). The prediction in H4 that the effect of information on action will be greater in a tax than in a windfall environment is captured by the slope of the tax line rising more steeply than that of the windfall line (as well as the positive treatment interaction in the bottom-right cell of the table).
B Campaign script and illustrations
Empowering Ci-zens to Combat the Resource Curse "Your Voice, Your Opportunity" Campaign Figure B .1: Campaign roadmap. The figure shows the cover illustration for the campaign, the 2x2 table with over-lapping revenue and information experiments (producing four groups), and the list of which illustrations to use for each group. Participants pretended that they were a district leader and used the rupiah on the revenue game board to show their ideal allocation of funds across six spending categories (education, infrastructure, health, farming, 'politicians', and others. They were also asked to illustrate how they thought the district government actually allocated funds. 
  
If you said "I WANT!" to any of the reforms above, please write the number of the reform you most want in the box:
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Figure D .1: The postcard (English). The two boxes at the top asked participants whether they 'want the district government to do a better job' (a sanction for incumbent performance) versus whether they were 'satisfied with the district government in Blora' ( a reward for incumbent performance). The remaining questions inquire into support for specific reforms to provide information to the local NGO partners and were not intended for analysis in the paper. The box in the bottom right cell of the postcard contained the randomly assigned respondent ID and connected the postcard to the participant's survey instrument and treatment assignment. Notes: Table reports summary statistics for the main outcome measures from both the survey and postcard campaign. Panel A presents summary statistics for the main effects of taxes (versus windfalls) on monitoring, participation, and incumbent sanctioning, as presented in Table 2 in the main text. Panel B presents summary statistics for the investigation into how the tax treatment worked, as presented in Table 3 in the main text. All question wordings are provided in the corresponding tables in the main text. 
E Randomization check and baseline data

G Additional results for how revenue conditions the impact of information
Here I provide additional tables and analysis to accompany Section 5.3 in the main text:
• Table G .1 provides the table for Figure 3 on how revenue conditions the effect of information on attitudes towards government.
• Table G .2 presents additional results for measures of how revenue conditions the impact of information on dissatisfaction with the district government and distrust in local legislators.
• Table G .3 provides the table for Figure 4 on how revenue conditions the effect of information on willingness to monitor the budget, participation in the postcard campaign, and incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign.
• Table G .4 presents additional results for how revenue conditions the impact of information on the other main measures of monitoring and participation.
• • Table H .1 presents the main effects of taxes versus windfalls on monitoring, participation, and sanctioning, corresponding to Table 2 in the main text.
• Table H Table 2 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. All question wordings are provided in the main text. Column 1 reports OLS results with controls and Neyman standard errors. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check ( Table ? ?) in the main text except for 'Married' and 'Javanese' due to low variation. Column 2 reports results from a regression with subdistrict fixed effects and column 3 reports results with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors are uncorrected in Columns 2-3 as negative intracluster correlation makes clustered standard errors smaller and heteroskedastic robust standard errors are biased in fixed effects regressions. Table 3 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. All question wordings are provided in the main text. Column 1 reports OLS results with controls and Neyman standard errors. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check ( Table ? ?) in the main text except for 'Married' and 'Javanese' due to low variation. Column 2 reports results from a regression with subdistrict fixed effects and column 3 reports results with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors are uncorrected in Columns 2-3 as negative intracluster correlation makes clustered standard errors smaller and heteroskedastic robust standard errors are biased in fixed effects regressions. Figure 4 in the main text and Panel C of Table  G .3 in the appendix. Significance levels are denoted by *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 (robust standard errors). Column 1 reports treatment effects with no controls while Column 2 reports treatment effects with controls. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check ( Table ? ?) in the main text except for 'Married' and 'Javanese' due to low variation. . Among those who were initially dissatisfied, however, neither taxes nor information had any effect. These results are interesting in that they suggest that the greatest gains to both taxes and information came from those who initially had a positive outlook on government. Additionally, they mirror the results above in that there also appears to be a ceiling to the effect of taxes on incumbent sanctioning among the initially satisfied.
.63 .77 .15*** n/s.e. Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments. Satisfied is coded as 0 for all those who said in the pre-treatment survey module that they were satisfied "with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall" and 1 for those who were dissatisfied. The net sanctioning effect of the postcard campaign (the outcome) is coded 1 for those who returned the postcard and sanctioned incumbent, -1 for those who returned the postcard and rewarded incumbent, and 0 for those who abstained from returning postcard. . Satisfaction is the proportion who said in the pre-treatment survey module that they were satisfied "with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall." Significance is denoted by *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on Neyman standard errors.
K Validity check: Spillover
Treatment effects are underestimated when there is spillover between the treatment and control groups. In designing the experiment, I took precautions to minimize the likelihood of spillover but also to measure whether it occurred. This was important since a dusun, as a sub-village unit, is a small community. There is perhaps only minor cause for concern about spillover for the tax treatment since it is based on a behavioral exercise that would be hard to replicate (although the information could spread). Similarly, the information in the information treatment is rather complicated and would be hard to convey in detail. Canvassers asked respondents not to discuss the campaign with their neighbors until after the program was over in their village. Teams also typically conducted all visits in a dusun in less than two days to minimize the time period during which spillover could occur. Piloting revealed some anecdotal evidence that information about the campaign spread, but this was typically basic information contained in the shared sections of the campaign rather than information specific to any particular treatment.
To assess the extent to which spillover impacts the estimation of treatment effects, I collected additional data on the postcard campaign. In each village, five extra postcards were left with the dusun head. If another community member approached a sampled participant to inquire about the campaign, the sampled participant was asked to refer that person to request a postcard from the dusun head. Sampled participants were asked not to advertise that the dusun head had extra postcards. The dusun head was also instructed not to hand out postcards unless a community member specifically requested one. The assumption is that the extent of spillover of information about the campaign is positively correlated with the number of additional postcards requested from the dusun head. Table 2 in the main text, where Column 1 is the main measure of monitoring, Column 2 the main measure of participation, and Column 3 the main measure of incumbent sanctioning. Panel A interacts the tax treatment with the continuous measure of spillover (the number of postcards of five claimed from the dusun head). Panel B interacts the tax treatment with a binary measure of spillover (equals 1 if greater than the village-level of mean of 2 postcards requested). Panel C is a restricted analysis where the treatment effect is estimated only in villages in which there was no evidence of spillover (no additional postcards were picked up from the dusun head) The results discussed in Section 6 in the main text suggest that participants responded not to the tax payment in the treatment but rather to the shift in the perceived share of taxes in total revenue. There are, however, difficulties associated with measuring the pain of an out-of-pocket loss using survey measures of tolerance for risky monetary gambles. To dig deeper into how the tax treatment worked-and specifically to look for additional evidence that participants reacted to the tax payment-I exploit the fact that the tax payment could have worked in two ways. First, it could have primed previous real-world experience paying taxes. If this were the case, we would expect to see that the effect of the tax treatment on political action outcomes would be bigger for those with more previous experience with taxation or bigger actual tax burdens. Second, it could have effectively simulated a tax payment regardless of previous tax experience.
I explore the former by assessing whether the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes of interest varied depending on previous experience with taxation. Table L .1 presents the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes of interest, conditional on four different measures of real world tax experience. The measures include whether: (1) the household had paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months; (2) the participant had personally ever paid a tax; (3) annual household taxes in the previous 12 months were high (greater than the mean); and (4) the household was poor (implying the 4,000 rupiah tax from the 14,000 rupiah income would matter more the participant). There is no evidence that any of these factors conditioned the effect of the tax treatment on monitoring, participation, or sanctioning. These results provide additional evidence that the tax payment did not operate by priming previous tax experience. Table 3 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. All question wordings for main outcome measures are provided in the main text. a Household paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months. b You mentioned that you pay taxes. Do you personally pay taxes or is another member of your household usually the one to pay? (Personally=1) c Annual household taxes are greater than the mean=1. d I would like you to think of your village in terms of three levels of poverty/wealth. Imagine that each level has about the same number of households in it. In your opinion, relative to other households in your village, which level is your household on? (Lowest level=1) 
